Why Erdogan keeps winning?
Summary:
Turkish Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan has managed to fuse Turkey’s center-right and
Islamist-right into one major bloc accepting his explanation of recent
political scandals to be conspiracies against his rule.
The March 30 elections will go down in history as yet another
political victory for Turkey’s powerful Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The national average his party won at
the ballots — 43% or 45% of the overall vote, based on the counting method applied — is certainly a big
success. Even if all the claims of fraud are true, especially in Ankara, it is clear that Erdogan’s Justice and
Development Party (AKP) is still very popular after 11 years in
power.
This might come as a
surprise to those observers, especially in the West, who thought that Erdogan
would lose support because of all the recent political scandals and
controversies in Turkey, such as corruption, authoritarianism and the shrinking
of certain liberties. Why, they might wonder, does Erdogan still
triumph despite all these problems.
To find an answer, one
should first look deeper into Turkish society and its political patterns. The
first thing to note is that for more than 60 years, throughout which Turkey had
regular free and fair elections, Turkish society has roughly been divided into
two unequal parts: “The right,” which constitutes some 60%-65% of the
votes, and “the left,” which constitutes the remaining 35%-40%. The right,
in this context, is defined by respect
for tradition — especially Sunni Islam — and a focus
on economic development. The left, in return, is defined by secularism and
socialist themes of “equality,” along with Alevism, an unorthodox branch of
Islam. (That is why today, Alevi music halls on Istanbul’s Istiklal Street
feature posters of Imam Ali, Ataturk and Che Guevara in the very same hall
of fame.)
The
right traditionally has three components: center-right,
Islamist-right and nationalist-right. Erdogan’s big success is that he
combined the first two under the AKP banner and thus created one of the largest
voting blocs in Turkish history. (The nationalist-right is still alive
separately, under the banner of the Nationalist Action Party (MHP),
which won some 15% of the national average on March 30.) Erdogan’s great
achievements regarding economic development — all the highways, skyscrapers,
shopping malls and hospitals built under his rule — is the hallmark of the
center-right. His Islamic rhetoric and symbolism is the bliss of the
Islamist-right.
Therefore, for the
center-right or Islamist Turkish voter, who makes up roughly half of society,
there is no reason to abandon Erdogan and opt for any of his current rivals.
The main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) is out of the
running for two main reasons: The CHP looks very incompetent when compared
to the AKP with regard to the economy and government services. Also, the
CHP’s ultra-secularist past, defined by the oppression and humiliation of the
religious conservatives with policies such as banning the headscarf still
makes the party a bete noire of the right in general.
In fact, the CHP is
trying to change both images under the leadership of Kemal Kilicdaroglu,
but the progress he has introduced is too little and too shallow. The CHP
should change more significantly by moving closer to the center. That the
party’s main boost in this election was in Ankara, thanks to its brand-new
candidate Mansur Yavas, an export from the center-right, is a telltale example.
But what about all the
corruption scandals that could have hurt Erdogan? Well, believe it or not, as
shown by a Turkish polling company: “Corruption claims had no effect on local polls.” One reason is
that the average Turkish voter recalls that every government recently has been
guilty of corruption, so the AKP, at worst, is no exception. (“They steal, but
at least they work hard,” is a common line one hears from Turkish taxi drivers.)
Second, many religious conservatives also believe that what looks like
corruption is in fact some form of informal fundraising for the “good cause” —
such as sponsoring Islamic foundations and charities.
Moreover, many
pro-Erdogan voters got only more attached to him precisely because of the
recent scandals. That most of those allegations were based on wiretaps that
were systematically exposed on the Internet only proved that there was indeed a
conspiracy against the government by the “parallel state.” Similarly, Erdogan’s bans on Twitter and
YouTube, which were condemned by liberals and the West as an attack on freedom,
was seen by the pro-Erdogan camp as a justified measure against these
“treacherous” campaigns.
This final issue also
brings us to the “Gulen movement”, Turkey’s most powerful Islamic community,
which Erdogan condemned as the master of the “parallel state” and the servant of “foreign powers” that
want to weaken Turkey.
Whatever the reality
regarding the “parallel state”
is, the Gulen movement — formerly a strong Erdogan
ally — certainly went out of its way to oppose Erdogan in these
elections, to the level of supporting the CHP, which is a grave sin for most
conservatives. In other words, the movement isolated itself from the bulk of
the Islamic camp and attracted the wrath of Erdogan. How this will play out in
the near future, and how extensive Erdogan’s promised crackdown on “the
parallel state” will be, is an interesting question these days.
One key consequence of
the election results was to raise Erdogan’s chance to win the presidential
elections, which are planned for Aug. 10. In fact, it is not yet clear
whether Erdogan will run for these elections, or perhaps support
President Abdullah Gul for his second term and remain in power as prime
minister. The latest results gave Erdogan a signal that he can win those
elections in the first round by winning a simple majority: by keeping his
current 45% and adding the votes of Kurdish nationalists, which have emerged lately as his
political allies.
The bottom line is
that Erdogan keeps winning Turkey’s ballots, and he is not likely to lose
anytime soon. Yet, while these persistent victories make the pro-Erdogan camp
happy and cheerful, it makes the rest — almost the other half of society —
desperate, angry and resentful.
Consequently, Turkey will be prone to more polarization, if not instability, should Erdogan not take steps to win the hearts and minds of his opponents and aim for a national reconciliation.
.......................................................The End..........................................................
Re Edited By: KANWAL ABIDI
*Political Analyst & Journalist
Information Shared By: Mustafa
Akyol
*Turkish
Journalist
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