Erdogan under pressure as Syrian crisis
spreads to Iraq
By: Kanwal Abidi
(Political Analyst & Journalist))
(Political Analyst & Journalist))
A highly risky
situation is emerging for Turkey on its eastern borders, as developments in northern Syria continue to deteriorate in
favor of al-Qaeda-related groups that are also trying to make headway in Iraq’s
strategic Anbar province. These developments have also pushed the question of
removing President Bashar al-Assad from power to the back burner for the West
as combating jihadists becomes a much more pressing need.
As work continues for
the Geneva II conference, Ankara remains opposed to any settlement that will
keep Assad in place. Addressing a Jan. 6 Nikkei conference in
Tokyo, where he was on an official visit, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan
underlined this point once again.
Referring to “certain
mistakes made at Geneva I,” Erdogan said, “We hope these mistakes will not be
made at Geneva II, that a successful result is obtained there and that a
step can be taken for a Syria without Bashar.”
Concern is
nevertheless increasing among Turkish security and intelligence officials over
the advances in Syria and Iraq by al-Qaeda-affiliated groups, particularly the
Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), whose name reflects its
ambitions.
Erdogan, of course,
has hardly any influence left in the region that could alter the situation
according to his expectations or desires. Other remarks by him in Tokyo also
suggested that he is still not prepared to come to terms with the situation
developing on the ground.
For example, he
emphasized the need for “democracy” and “respect for the will of the people” of
Syria. Erdogan still appears to believe that a result can be obtained in Geneva
which would, in addition to getting rid of Assad, make this possible.
The West, however,
seems to be much more concerned presently with the urgent need to stabilize
Syria as much as is possible, and to address the issue of the radical Islamists
whose brutality matches that of the regime.
Diplomats in Ankara
agree that if such groups are seen to be gaining absolute control over the
areas they are operating in, this could end up making Assad the “lesser of two
evils” for many. Concern about these groups, and particularly ISIS, has already
made indirect allies of the United States, Russia and Iran in Iraq.
These countries are
promising military assistance to the government of Prime Minister Nouri
al-Maliki as it combats ISIS in Anbar province, which shares a long border
with Syria and contains the city of Fallujah. Turkey has little support
left for its position on Syria, with the exception of some regional
countries headed by Saudi Arabia, a country that it is at odds with over Egypt.
Riyadh is reportedly
behind the group of “moderate Salafists” operating under the banner of “the
Islamic Front,” which is also fighting al-Qaeda elements in Syria and,
according to media claims, also receiving support from Turkey and Qatar
for this.
Many in Turkey wonder
now if the truck that was stopped as it headed for the Syrian border by
Turkish police, who media reports said were acting on a tip that it was
laden with weapons, was destined for this front. The truck was
subsequently allowed to continue on its way on orders from the
government, preventing it from being searched. All the Erdogan
government has been prepared to say about the truck is that its cargo contained aid for Syrian Turkmen. It has refused to elaborate by citing
the law protecting state secrets.
Al-Monitor’s Edward Dark characterized the Islamic
Front as “a fusion of Salafist jihadist Islamist groups, not as extreme in ideology as
al-Qaeda's [ISIS] or Jabhat al-Nusra, but nevertheless by no means
mainstream like the Free Syrian Army (FSA). It openly calls for Islamic Sharia
rule instead of secular democracy.”
Being on the same page
with Riyadh concerning Assad’s demise does not mean, however, that the Syrian
policies of Turkey and Saudi Arabia are driven by similar considerations. It is
clear that Riyadh’s primary concern is to keep Iran at bay, even if this comes
at the cost of settling for a failed state ruled by Sunni extremists, rather
than an Iran-friendly regime in Syria, as Dark puts it.
Meanwhile, the bloody
internecine fighting among jihadists in northern Syria, where they are vying
for control over the areas they once captured from regime together, poses
further complications for Ankara. To start with, it adds to the volatility
on Turkey’s borders and increases the possibility of undesired spillover
effects.
One such effect was
the kidnapping of Turkish journalist Bunyamin Aygun more than a month ago in
northern Syria by ISIS. Aygun, a seasoned war correspondent, was rescued over
the weekend after a harrowing time only kilometers from the Turkish border. His
rescuers, according to his own account, were from the group calling
itself Ahrar al-Sham.
Aygun told the media
that members of this group, which is attached to the Islamic Front, fought ISIS
forces for three and a half days to secure his release. Aygun was brought to
Turkey by members of the Turkish intelligence service MIT, which has reinforced
the belief that Turkey is in close contact with the Islamic Front.
This incident has also
fueled speculation about the mysterious truck stopped last week. Many believe
now that it may have been carrying weapons to Ahrar al-Sham, either as the
price for rescuing Aygun from ISIS or as a regular consignment.
If true, this would
anger Turkey’s Western allies, who have been pressing Ankara not to provide
support to radical Islamist fighters in Syria and to help bolster
moderate and secular forces in the country instead. The Saudi-backed
Islamic Front, it appears, is also in the West’s black book.
Washington and London
stopped all aid to the Syrian opposition in early December, when fighters
attached to the Islamic Front seized a depot full of weapons belonging to the
FSA. The incident demonstrated that any lethal equipment provided to the FSA
could easily fall into the hands of radical elements.
All of this is a far
cry from Ankara’s initial expectations for Syria. Rather than being a “game
setter,” as it once hoped, Ankara is being led by events today. Meanwhile,
there is an increasing possibility that Iran will participate in Geneva II,
especially after US Secretary of State John Kerry’s green light for it.
Ankara is trying to
convince Tehran to at least accept that Assad should go in any settlement for
Syria, even if key elements of his regime remain. The matter was broached again
by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu when he met his Iranian counterpart
Mohammad Javad Zarif in Istanbul on Dec. 4.
However, Turkey is
unlikely to succeed in this venture, given Tehran’s unwavering support for
Assad since the start of the Syrian crisis.The only real option left to
Erdogan, therefore, is to go beyond reluctant expressions of hope that Geneva
II will work, and to see what he can do to make sure it works, with or
without Assad. This appears particularly crucial at a time when a bigger danger
than Assad is looming for Turkey, the region and the world.
Special Thanks to: Al Monitor Corresondents
Special Thanks to: Al Monitor Corresondents
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