GCC rift another blow
to Erdogan’s Mideast policies
*Editor's Note:
BY: Kanwal Abidi *Political Commentator on Middle East Politics
The whole Gulf Region is going under radical change with Saudi led allies taking full advantage to capitalize the global jihad into its own ulterior motives! Turkey has a very sensitive geo-strategic position by sharing Syria's border and Ankara being a key player in the teams of offending Saudi players!
Turkey’s already
waning influence in the Middle East has taken fresh blows as a result of the
Saudi-led move to isolate Qatar because of its backing of the Muslim
Brotherhood, and Egypt’s decision to ban Hamas, which is widely considered to
be a Brotherhood offshoot.
Qatar today remains
one of the few regional allies of any note Turkey has left in a region where
the government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan once hoped somewhat
ambitiously to be a major player. Madawi Al-Rasheed, in
her March 6 analysis for Al-Monitor, provides the background
to Saudi efforts against Qatar in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)
that clearly have implications for Ankara.
Turkey started losing
regional influence after Erdogan abandoned the country’s traditional policy of
neutrality in Middle Eastern disputes, starting with the crisis in Syria, and
revealed his sectarian preferences. This development, dubbed the
“Sunnification of Turkish foreign policy” by Erdogan’s domestic and foreign
critics, also revealed Erdogan’s great affinity for the Muslim Brotherhood.
Erdogan and his
Justice and Development Party (AKP) are not just seen today as staunch
supporters of the Brotherhood, but also as a key member of what has been
referred to as the “Muslim Brotherhood International.”
Tellingly, former
Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi — whose political future in the “new Egypt”
appeared guaranteed at the time — and Khaled Meshaal, the leader of
Hamas’ political bureau, were invited by Erdogan to the AKP’s general congress held in September 2012, where they
were the principle guests of honor.
Both men had received
standing ovations before and after delivering heated speeches in support of
Erdogan and his party, during which they indicated that Turkey under the
Islamist AKP was a main force that would help shape the new Middle East.
Erdogan, Morsi and
Meshaal did not suspect at the time that there were regional forces — other
than Israel — working to their detriment.
On the contrary, all
three leaders saw themselves as unstoppable and considered their political
future guaranteed. It was no surprise therefore that the coup in Egypt, which
ousted Morsi in July 2013, should have caught Erdogan totally off guard.
Neither did Erdogan expect a key regional Islamic power like Saudi Arabia — and
a Sunni one to boot — to come out with such strong political and financial
support for a coup led by Egypt’s predominantly secularist military.
Turkey has been in the
same with Saudi Arabia and Egypt over the Syrian question but the rift between
these countries and Ankara developed rapidly after the Egyptian coup. It became
more prominent after Erdogan unleashed an angry barrage of invective and
maledictions, laced with religious imagery, against Egypt’s new rulers and
their supporters.
Although Erdogan has
been more circumspect in terms of accusing Saudi Arabia directly, his remarks
concerning Egypt were nevertheless noted with dissatisfaction in Riyadh and
other anti-Brotherhood regimes in the Gulf that supported the Egyptian coup.
Egypt, for its part, downgraded diplomatic
ties with
Ankara and still refuses to send its ambassador back, accusing the Erdogan
government of meddling in its internal affairs.
Erdogan also fell out
with Iran and the Shiite-led government of Nouri al-Maliki in Baghdad over the
Syrian crisis, leaving Ankara with hardly any potential for taking
proactive diplomatic initiatives aimed at trying to stabilize the turbulent
region.
Turkey and Iran
maintain a veneer of good ties, but continue to support opposing groups in
Syria. Tehran accuses Ankara of prolonging the Syrian crisis, while government
officials in Ankara say Bashar al-Assad — Erdogan’s principle regional nemesis
— would not have survived so long without support from Tehran.
Turkey’s good
relations with Israel — once considered even by regional governments as one of
Ankara’s main diplomatic assets, given that it was on friendly terms with all
parties in the Middle East — also remain at rock bottom.
These ties began to
sour following Erdogan’s overt support for Hamas after he came to power. They
took a nosedive after nine pro-Palestinian Turkish activists were killed by
Israeli commandos when their ship, the Mavi Marmara, tried to
break the Israeli blockade of the Gaza Strip in May 2010 with the tacit
blessings of the Erdogan government.
Given this overall
background, Turkey today is seen, from Tehran to Riyadh and from Baghdad to
Cairo, as an unwelcome outside meddler in Middle Eastern affairs that has to be
kept at bay. Saudi Arabian and Egyptian officials are also well-aware that Doha
and Istanbul have become main hubs for leaders of the
exiled Muslim Brotherhood.
These developments
represent a series of blows to Erdogan’s plans to advance political Islam in Turkey
and the Middle East. He is currently embroiled in what he sees as an
existential struggle to ward off serious corruption charges at home, involving
himself and his government, which has also pushed his Islamist agenda to the
background for the moment.
Meanwhile, the gains
in the Middle East by the Muslim Brotherhood started to be rolled back with the
Egyptian coup, much to Erdogan’s annoyance. He is waiting for a strong turnout
in the local elections at the end of this month, which he says will not only
exonerate his government from corruption charges, but give him the power to
fight against his enemies.
These enemies
undoubtedly include the Egyptian strongman Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, whose regime
he continues to vilify at domestic political rallies in the lead up to the
local elections on March 30.
“Don’t forget that
date is not just an ordinary one. It will also be the date when the spirit of
our daughter Asma in Cairo will be beatified. Don’t forget she too was longing
in Cairo for the things that we areexperiencing in this
country,” Erdogan told a
rally in Adiyaman on March 4.
Erdogan was referring
to Asma al-Beltaji, who was killed during a pro-Morsi demonstration in Cairo’s
Rabia al-Adawiya Square in August 2013. Erdogan also recalled that Asma’s
father, Mohamed al-Beltaji, had chanted, “Long live hell for cruel oppressors,”
while he was being dragged to prison on the day his daughter was martyred.
Erdogan can be
expected to continue with this kind of language, especially if he comes out
strong from the local elections, thus alienating himself further from those
governments that represent today’s established order in the Middle East, who consider
the Muslim Brotherhood as their enemy.
Madawi al-Rasheed
points out in her analysis for Al-Monitor, “The Muslim
Brotherhood's base in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf in general remains the educated
middle classes, a class that is destined to widen as a result of the expansion
of mass education.” This suggests that time is on the side of the Brotherhood
in the long run.
It is unlikely,
however, that the Brotherhood will be allowed anywhere near a ballot box again
any time soon in Egypt, or elsewhere in the Middle East, especially after the
experience in Egypt.
Morsi’s overtly
Islamist policies at the expense of other groups in Egypt after he came to
power, a fact that was most apparent in the way his administration prepared the
country’s new constitution, also cost him much sympathy in the West.
As long as the present
Saudi regime and its GCC allies remain in power they will also ensure that
Turkey under Erdogan is kept at a distance and prevented from playing a major
political role in the region. They will also have support in this from
principle Arab League members, starting with Egypt.
The Erdogan
government’s friendly ties with Qatar and Hamas, on the other hand, will not
alter the picture much. It is very likely that by the time the Muslim
Brotherhood comes to a position of power again in the region, it will be too
late for Erdogan, whose own position as a political player looks unlikely to
survive that long.
*Middle East
Columnist
Re EDITED By: Kanwal Abidi
*Political Analyst
& Journalist
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